Tips for Maintaining Your Hybrid Vehicle

Hybrids differ little from regular vehicles when it comes to routine maintenance items. Other than the systems that control the onboard storage batteries and the additional electric drive motor, routine maintenance for hybrids follows pretty much lock step with your fathers Oldsmobile. Follow our routine vehicle maintenance schedule to make sure you have all of the basics covered. Full Hybrid Vehicles If operated as designed, full hybrid vehicles have the ability to shut off their internal combustion engines and operate on the electric motor only under certain conditions. (e.g. low-speed maneuvering and light cruising). Needless to say, the engine doesn’t work as hard resulting in reduced wear and tear. Hybrids also often employ regenerative braking systems that both charge the batteries and reduce wear on brake components. Because of the way that the internal combustion engine, the electric drive motor, and the transmission are mated together to work more or less as an entity, a malfunction in one component can affect the way the others function. Serious troubleshooting, diagnosis, and repair of this system is best left to professionals. You can check the transmission fluid, change out spark plugs and fuel and air filters, but delving much deeper does require specialized training. Sophisticated Electronics The complex electronic modules that control the electric drive motor for both propulsion and regenerative braking can generate enormous amounts of heat, so those often have their own dedicated cooling systems. The battery control modules regulate both charge and discharge rates as well as the state of charge of the entire bank. To operate consistently under all conditions, these systems will often employ both heating and cooling systems. When performing the regular maintenance on the engine cooling system, remember to check the individual hoses, pipes, and clamps as well as any additional filters that may be used on the motor and battery cooling/heating system. Be Safe and Beware the Orange Hybrids generally are equipped with dual voltage systems. Though most of the electrical system is safe standard 12-volt, the drive motor and related components operate well in excess of 100 volts. The safety threshold is low and narrow, an electrical shock with as little as 50 volts can prove fatal. To warn technicians and operators of these high voltage circuits, the cables are wrapped in a bright orange casing. To safely maintain and repair these components, the system must be de-powered, a task that is absolutely best left to trained technicians.

General Movements Assessment ( An Annotated Bibliography

†¢ General Movements Assessment (Summer 2014) o As an innovative teaching practice, the student completed an annotated bibliography regarding the General Movements Assessment (see Artifact XI.F.vi.1). This annotated bibliography was subsequently utilized for development of the Institutional Review Board Application (submitted to Cleveland Clinic and Cleveland State University) as well as with faculty development of regional and national conference presentations (Using Prechtl’s Assessment of General Movements to Determine Long-Term Neurobehavioral Sequelae in a Neonate with Congenital Pneumonia; Making Sense of the Baby Brain: Use of Prechtl s Assessment of General Movements to Predict Neurological Impairments in the Neonate; and†¦show more content†¦This annotated bibliography helped to provide evidence to support development of a program designed to integrate use of the interactive metronome during therapy for children with special needs. †¢ Smart Wheel (Summer 2014) o As an innovative teaching practice aimed to bridge didactic learning with clinical experience, this special topic elective was created in collaboration with a clinician at the Cleveland Clinic Children’s Hospital for Rehabilitation. The student was jointly supervised by the clinician and me, with student outcomes that included learning about the research process as well as gaining clinical observation experiences in pediatrics, which are otherwise limited as part of our current curriculum. The student project entailed completion of an annotated bibliography. Its content specifically identified evidence-based protocols to potentially implement as standard clinical practice with pediatric patients at Cleveland Clinic Children’s Hospital for Rehabilitation. †¢ Torticollis and Strabismus (Summer 2014) o As an innovative teaching practice aimed to bridge didactic learning with clinical experience, this special topic elective was created in collaboration with a clinician at the Cleveland Clinic Children’s Hospital for Rehabilitation. The student was jointly supervised by the clinician and me, with student outcomes that included learning about the research process as well as gaining clinical

The Importance of Janes Early Life at Lowood to Shaping...

The Importance of Janes Early Life at Lowood to Shaping Her Character in Charlotte Brontes Jane Eyre When Charlotte BrontÃÆ' « set out to write Jane Eyre, she boldly promised her sisters: a heroine as plain and as small as myself, who shall be as interesting as any of yours. As promised, Jane appears decidedly plain, so little, so pale, with features so irregular and so marked, sensible but not at all handsome, queer and a little toad. The novel opens at Gateshead with Jane moving from childhood to puberty. Even at ten years of age, Jane feels that I can never get away from Gateshead till I am a woman and tells this to Mr Lloyd. She actually leaves by the end of Chapter 4.†¦show more content†¦The forced wearing of the uniform obliterates distinctions between all age groups young and older. Mr Brocklehurst, the self-righteous minister of Lowood, tells Miss Temple you are aware that my plan in bringing up these girls, is not to accustom them to luxury and indulgence, but to render them hardy, patient and self-denying. Mr Brocklehurst stresses the importance of plain clothing and humility (but his own family have long beautiful hair and are dressed richly). It was this influence that Jane was never able to shake and at Thornfield, she continued to wear dull clothes covered by a plain pinafore. She had, however, no influence over the clothes which Adele chose to wear. Even on her wedding day, Jane would no t conform by wearing elaborate headwear. Jane herself is very clear about the sort of demeanour that is required of a governess. When Rochester has guests at Thornfield, she knows she must shrink into the shade. She is expected to be present in the drawing room in the evening but not take part in the conversation unless directly addressed. She frequently refers to the plainness of her dress, and sometimes to her own lack of physical beauty, as appropriate to a governess. When she thinks she is about to marry Rochester, she is not really surprised at Mrs Fairfaxs opinion that it is unwise for her to move out of her own class and into his. BrocklehurstShow MoreRelatedEssay on Jane Eyre: An Orphan’s Success Story1750 Words   |  7 PagesJane Eyre: An Orphan’s Success Story       In Victorian literature, the orphan can be read as an unfamiliar and strange figure outside the dominant narrative of domesticity (Peters 18). They were often portrayed as poor children without a means of creating a successful life for themselves. Charlotte Bronte’s Jane Eyre, however, is a portrayal of a female orphan who triumphs over almost every environment she enters. Therefore, Jane’s ability to overcome the hardships that she encounters is a fictional

The Impact Of Social Workers On Children And Family...

When I was seven, my family was involved in a head-on collision where our Chevy Nova hydroplaned into a Dodge Ram. Severe injuries that occurred both in this accident and a second one two years later (caused by a drunk driver), resulted in both of my parents being permanently disabled and piles of medical bills. By the time I was in the 5th grade my mom and I became heavily involved in various volunteer organizations for low income families, particularly Neighbor Impact and a similar group called Bread of Life. For years these two programs kept my family financially afloat.. I would like to pursue this career in order to help connect families like mine with various resources that will help them get back on their feet. Social workers are the critical bridge between families and the resources that they need. The job of those specializing in child and family services may include protecting children and families from domestic abuse, discrimination, and illness. 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European journal of law economics Free Essays

1 Introduction Liability rules are important tool of environmental risks management in Canada, United States and Europe. The major legislations are CERCLA (Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act) adopted by the American Congress in 1980 and the Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on Environmental Liability with regard to the Prevention and remedying of environmental Damages which came into force in April 2004. A *E. We will write a custom essay sample on European journal of law economics or any similar topic only for you Order Now J.L. E. 78 liability rule induces correct incentive for risk prevention only if information is symmetric and the potential injurer has sufficient wealth to cover his liability. Indeed, it is well known from the previous literature that when the injurer’s wealth is not sufficient to pay liability judgments ex post (the injurer is said to be judgment-proof) this leads to underprovision of care ex ante (Summers 1983; Shavell 1986). In the case of environmental risks, on the one hand, perfect control of firm’s actions in prevention is not possible, and on the other hand, the wealth of the polluter may be small relative to the clean-up costs and victims’ compensation. There are many policies to alleviate the judgment-proof problem. The first one is to extend liability to the parties who have a contractual relationship with the risky firm, the case under CERCLA which imposes extended liability to lenders. The economic analysis of the extended liability has given raise to mitigated results. Pitchford (1995) considers a one-period moral hazard model with two states of nature (accident or not). Since the loan fee fixed by the lender included his expected liability costs, the more the lender is liable, the more he charges the firm in the no-accident state. Then, the state of the nature â€Å"no-accident† becomes unfavourable for the firm and the full liability of the lender2 leads to a suboptimal level of effort whereas partial lender’s liability allows achieving the optimal level of prevention. In a two-period model, Boyer and Laffont (1997) show that partial liability of lender is optimal. Consequently, these authors conclude that the s ociety has to make a tradeoff between prevention and compensation. In an alternative setting in which environmental damages are stochastic and prevention cost is a monetary investment that needs external funding, Dionne and Spaeter (2003) show that lender extended liability has a positive effect on the firm’s prevention level if and only if an increase in the face value of the debt implies an increase in prevention investment. Moreover, Balkenborg (2001) and Lewis and Sappington (2001) show that the benefits of extending liability to lenders depend on the observability of the firm’s prevention level by the lender, the bargaining power of each party and the nature of environmental damages. Finally, Hutchison and Van’t Veld (2005) consider a model with both observable damage-reducing activities and non-observable probability-reducing measures and show that introducing extended liability to lender induces judgement-proof firms with high gross profits to take social ly optimal levels of care, those with intermediate gross profits to take suboptimal level of care and drives those with low gross profits out of business. Financial responsibility is another remedy for the judgment-proof problem. Under a regime of financial responsibility, the firm is required to demonstrate that the cost of the harm she can cause is covered. The most common instrument of financial responsibility is the insurance contract. But as it is well known, the compulsory liability insurance induces the efficient level of prevention only when the insurer is able to observe the prevention level performed by the firm (Shavell 1986; Jost 1996; Polborn 1998). Following the analysis of Jost (1996), Feess and*E.J.L. E. 79 Hege (2000, 2003) consider a model with monitoring-based incentives and show that the mandatory liability coverage for total harm leads to an allocation that is closed to the first-best. In this paper, we investigate how the socially optimal allocation can be implemented through ex ante financial responsibility and ex post strict liability rule. We do not restrict our analysis to insurance contract but on contrary analyze financial guarantee contract. Indeed, in the Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on environmental liability there is a focus on a future legislation that imposes financial responsibility on the polluting firms. Then we analyze the consequences of financial responsibility on the incitation to prevention in a context of asymmetric information and show that the first-best allocation may be attainable. This follows from the fact that the level of damages provides a signal of the firm’s prevention level (Lewis and Sappington 1999) and can be used to design an optimal contract. But contrary to Lewis and Sappington (1999), in our setting, prevention measures do not only involve a disutility for the firm but also reduce the funds ava ilable for compensation and clean-up (Beard 1990; Lipowsky-Posey 1993; Dionne and Spaeter 2003; Dari-Mattiaci and De Geest 2005). We consider a firm which activity yields a non-random gross profit and generates random environmental damages. The firm can improve the distribution of damages by an investment in prevention at the beginning of the period and safety measures during the production process. At the end of the period, only the damages and the resources of the firm net of the prevention cost are observable. Moreover, it is assumed that the firm’s wealth is lower than the highest amount of damages its activity can generate. We establish a necessary and sufficient condition for the implementation of the socially optimal allocation in spite of moral hazard when the firm is mandated to cover the highest amount of damages its activity can generate. We also demonstrate that the set of contracts that implement the socially optimal level of prevention includes a particular contract of the form â€Å"reward or maximal penalty† which is closed to a finite risk product referred to as spread loss treaty . The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The following section presents the firm’s optimal choice in the absence of the financial responsibility regime. Section 3 investigates the impact of financial responsibility on the firm’s prevention level. Finally, Section 4 concludes. 2 The optimal choice of the firm without financial responsibility Consider a risk-neutral firm which activity generates a fixed profit P and creates a possibility of environmental damages ## ]0, L[. The firm can improve the distribution of damages by an investment in prevention at the beginning of the period and safety measures during the production process; these two measures are represented by a single prevention variable denoted e. However, the reduction of risk generates a cost c(e) when the firm chooses a level of prevention e. Moreover we assume that before engaging in its activity, the firm has initial wealth (equity) Rwhich can be partially used to cover the cost induced by prevention measures. Let f(##/e) and F(##/e) be respectively the density and the distribution function of the damages; the following is assumed: *E.J.L. E. 80 Assumption 1 ##e, f(##/e) 0, decreases with ##.3 This means that the observation of a lower level of damage is relatively more likely if a higher level of prevention has been adopted. This assumption implies the first order stochastic dominance: ## ]0, L[,Fe (##/e) 0. Moreover, Fe (0/e) = Fe (L/e) = 0. Assumption 2 ## ]0, L[, Fee (##/e) 0. This distribution function is strictly concave in e. 4 Assumption 3 ce (e) 0 and cee(e) 0. The prevention cost is strictly convex in e. Assumption 4 If the amount of damages is very high, the firm’s assets may be insufficient for compensation; then the firm will be pushed into bankruptcy. Assume that the discount rate is null so that the firm’s net value without investment in prevention noted ## equals R + P.Formally, this liability assumption can be written as L ##. What about the optimal level of prevention from the firm’s point of viewThe intuition suggests that a firm facing limited liability will underinvest in prevention. But, as stated by the following lemma this is not always true. Lemma 1 A judgment-proof firm does not always choose a suboptimal prevention level. Proof: See the â€Å"Appendix†. The social welfare criterion is assumed to be the minimization of the total cost which is the sum of the expected damages and the prevention cost. We assume that the regulator observes the prevention level. At the social optimum, the expected marginal benefit of prevention equals the expected marginal cost. The objective of the firm is to maximize its net revenue which equals to the sum of its profit and equity minus the expected liability payments (compensation and clean-up costs). The firm can only pay up to her assets. Hence the private expected marginal benefit is lower than the social one because of the partial internalization of environmental damages by the firm. Moreover, the private expected marginal cost of prevention is lower than the social one because the funds invested in prevention are not available for compensation and clean-up. At the private optimal level of prevention, the private expected marginal benefit of prevention equals the private expected marginal cost. Consequently, the optimal private level of prevention may be lower or higher than the socially optimal one, depending on which effect dominates. However, the judgment-proofness of the firm may result in a partial remediation of damages. One can think about compulsory liability insurance which covers the highest amount of damages as a solution to this problem. But it is well known from economics literature that when care is non-observable, a full insurance leads to underprovision of care by the insured. In the following section we demonstrate that under a guarantee structure, incentives work well even if it is *E.J.L. E. 81 impossible to observe the care by the polluter. The reason is that under the guarantee the polluter receives a return on investment in prevention. Moreover, this scheme provides the full coverage of damages: prevention and compensation are both satisfied. 3 Financial responsibility This section is devoted to the economic analysis of a hybrid regime of ex ante regulation through financial responsibility requirement and ex post strict liability. More precisely, in our setting the financial responsibility takes the form of a guarantee provided by another party that has deep pockets. Then the hybrid regime can be viewed as a regime of vicarious liability in which the guarantor and the firm are joint liable. As we know, in this setting, the victims generally choose to collect from the guarantor because the later has deep-pockets. Then, in what follows, we will assume that the firm and its guarantor are jointly liable and that it is the guarantor who has to compensate for the damages generated by the firm.5,6 The analysis is based on the principal-agent paradigm. In this framework, the firm is the limited liability risk neutral agent and the guarantor is the risk neutral principal. The prevention level performed by the firm and consequently the cost of such a measure are not observable by the principal. Moreover, the amount of damages and the net resources of the firm at the end of the period are observable. The timing of the model is as follows. First, the guarantor and the firm sign a contract which stipulates the state-contingent-payments (transfers) that the firm has to make to his guarantor. Secondly, the firm performs a level of prevention and bears the associated cost which is unobservable by the guarantor. Then, the profit is realized and the damages occur and finally the transfer is made to the guarantor. Moreover, it is assumed that the guarantor has all the bargaining power and his objective is to design a scheme of transfers that maximizes his profit. However, the guarantor ha s to take into account some constraints. The first one is the participation constraint of the firm which reflects the fact that the financial guarantee must yield expected revenue at least equals to what the firm would have obtained without contracting (condition 1). The second one is the firm’s limited liability constraint (condition 2). The third constraint reflects the fact that the transfer is bounded below in such a way that the firm could be rewarded (condition 3).7 The last condition is the incentive compatibility constraint which reflects the optimal behaviour of the firm in choosing the prevention level (condition 4).8 *E.J.L. E. 82 Formally, if we denote t(##) the transfer made by the firm when the amount of damages equals ##, the guarantor’s problem (P1) can be written as: TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT DISPLAYABLE subject to TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT DISPLAYABLE The existence of schemes of transfers that solve the problem above is not guaranteed. Then it is essential to characterize the conditions under which the problem (P1) admits a solution for a given utility u (expected firm revenue) and a given prevention level e. We can establish the following result: Proposition 2 The problem (P1) admits a solution, i.e. the levels of utility u and prevention e can be implemented if and only if: TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT DISPLAYABLE Proof: See the â€Å"Appendix†. The intuition underlying the proposition 2 is the following. For a given level of prevention e it is not possible to find a scheme of transfers that gives a level of utility u if the marginal cost of such a measure is greater than the marginal benefit. Let us remark that the marginal benefit of prevention is reflected by the reduction of the expected transfers that the firm has to pay to her guarantor. We have demonstrated (see the â€Å"Appendix†) that there is a scheme %23t(##) that gives the maximum marginal benefit of prevention, which equals [## – c(e) – B]Fe (##). If this upper limit of the marginal benefit of prevention is lower than the marginal cost of prevention for a given e, then any scheme of transfers cannot implement the prevention level e. From the analysis above we can derive the following result: Proposition 3 The social optimum (u, e*) can be implemented with the financial responsibility if and only if: TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT DISPLAYABLE *E.J.L. E. 83 Proof: See the â€Å"Appendix† The left-hand-side term of the condition (5) represents the rate of change of the marginal benefit of prevention at the point e* with a transfers scheme %23t(##), whereas the right-hand-side represents the rate of change of the marginal cost of prevention at the same point. Consequently if there is a level of damage ## such that the rate of change of the marginal benefit is at least equal to the rate of change of the marginal cost of prevention then the social optimum can be implemented. The last step of the analysis is devoted to the characterization of a scheme of transfers that implements the first-best level of prevention. We can establish the following proposition: Proposition 4 The set of transfers that implement the socially optimal level of prevention contains a scheme of the following form: TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT DISPLAYABLE Proof: See the â€Å"Appendix† The scheme of transfers 23t(##) is such that if at the end of the period, the actual damage is lower than the target level ##, then the firm is rewarded by receiving the bonus payment B, so her net revenue at the end of the period equals ## Conversely if the actual damage is greater than the target level ##, then the payment made by the firm to the guarantor equals ## – c(e*) and the firm net revenue at the end is null. This form of contract can be approached to a spread loss treaty. It is an alternative risk transfer (ART) solution, more precisely a finite risk product. By this contract, the financial responsibility of the firm is transferred to her guarantor (that can be a bank or an insurer).9,10 At the beginning of the contract, the firm pays either annual or single premium into a so-called experience account. Furthermore, the two parties contractually agree on an investment return. The funds are used to compensation and the rest is returned to the client. But if the claims payments exceed the funds available, the client has to pay the remainder. In this paper, we consider a one-period model. Consequently, the model can be viewed as if we have aggregated the periods of the spread loss treaty. Moreover, if the realized damages are low, the funds into the experience account are sufficient for compensation whereas in the bad states of nature (high realized damages), the funds *E.J.L. E. 84 are not sufficient. Hence, because of its limited liability, the firm cannot pay back the claims payments of the guarantor. Then, the guarantor takes this fact into account by penalizing the firm in the intermediate states of nature [those such that the amount of damages is between the target level ## and ## – c(e*)]. Consequently, the reward is used as an incentive device. 4 Concluding remarks A potentially judgment-proof firm may not internalize the social cost of its activity and then may have insufficient incentives to choose the socially optimal level of prevention. Whereas most of papers studied the incentive effect of extending liability to the lenders of the injurer-firm, this paper on contrary considers another remedy to the problems generated by the judgment-proofness. I demonstrate that a full financial responsibility (operation licence subject to the demonstration of a financial guarantee which covers the highest remediation cost) is compatible with the socially optimal level of prevention and establish a necessary and sufficient condition under which this is realized. Furthermore, I have shown that when the socially optimal outcome is attainable, a contract of the form â€Å"reward or maximum penalty† is included in the set of first-best solutions. Such a contract rewards the firm when the actual damages are lower than a target level because the guarantor infers that the firm took an adequate prevention level. Conversely, if the amount of the damages exceeds the target level, then the firm is maximally punished. This particular contract can be approach to an alternative risk transfer product referred to as spread loss treaty. Consequently, the alternative risk transfer solutions seem suited not only for the hedging of environmental risks, but also for incentive purpose. Finally, recall that the Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on Environmental Liability has a special focus on a future legislation which imposes financial responsibility on the polluting firms. It is necessary that before the promulgation of such legislation, European authorities help insurance and banking sectors to develop the market for environmental guarantees. Acknowledgments I am very grateful to an anonymous referee and to the editor for helpful remarks on a previous version of the paper. I would like to thank Jean-Marc Bourgeon, Georges Dionne, Marie-Cecile Fagart, Mahamadou Fall, Claude Fluet, Bruno Jullien, Anne Lavigne, Remi Moreau, Pierre Picard, Sandrine Spaeter, Jean-Marc Tallon and Daniel Zajdenweber. The paper also benefited from the comments of session participants of the 2005 SCSE congress in Charlevoix, 2005 AFSE congress in Paris and seminar participants at HEC Montreal, Universite d’Orleans, Universite de Sherbrooke and Universite du Quebec a Montreal. Financial support by CREF-HEC and the hospitality of the Canada Research Chair in risk management are acknowledged. Appendix Proof of lemma 1 The social optimum e* is the solution of the following problem: TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT DISPLAYABLE *E.J.L. E. 85 The associated first-order condition is given by: TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT DISPLAYABLE The firm’s problem can be written as: TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT DISPLAYABLE TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT DISPLAYABLE The left-hand-side term of Eq. 6 (7) represents the social (private) expected marginal cost of prevention and the right-hand-side represents the social (private) expected marginal benefit. From the comparison of (6) and (7) eP can be lower or higher than e*. Proof of proposition 2 Part 1: u ## [u,## – c(e) – B] Every level of utility u is given by the following expression: TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT DISPLAYABLE Taking into account this expression, the objective function of the guarantor becomes: TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT DISPLAYABLE Moreover, (2) and (3) imply: ## – c(e) ? ## t(##)f(##/e)d## ? B; thus 0?u ? ## – c(e) – B Consequently, the existence of a transfers scheme verifying (1), (2) and (3) implies that the utility of the firm is bounded: u ## [u,## – c(e) – B]. Note that the principal’s objective function depends only on the expected transfer (by u). Therefore, all solutions that verify the agent’s incentive constraint and that have the *E.J.L. E. 86 same expectation are equivalent from the principal’s point of view. However, the existence of such solutions is not guaranteed. Indeed, if the problem does not admit a solution, then it is not possible to implement a given level of prevention e for a given level of utility u. Part 2: [## – c(e) – B]Fe (##/e) ? ce(e) Let us assume that u ## [u,## – c(e) – B], then the next step consists to establish conditions under which the incentive constraint (4) is satisfied. Let ## = {t(##)/B ? t(##) ? ## – c(e)##}, be the set of admissible transfers. Let us define:G[t(-)] = ## t(##)fe(##/e)d##; m = min ## t(##)fe(##/e)d## and M = max ##t(##)fe(##/e)d##. We can establish that m is strictly negative and M strictly positive.11 Thus the function G [t(.)] is bounded in the set of admissible transfers. Then the validity of the incentive constraint depends on the value taken by m as follows. Lemma 2 the incentive constraint is satisfied for a given e and u if and only if: TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT DISPLAYABLE Lemma 3 the scheme of transfers %23t(##) which minimizes the function G [t(-)] = ## t(##)fe(##/e)d## has the following form 12: TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT DISPLAYABLE The second part of proposition 2 follows from lemmas 2 and 3. Proof of proposition 3 From proposition 2, we can derive that when the guarantor’s problem (P1) admits at least one solution, it is equivalent to the following problem (P1bis): TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT DISPLAYABLE TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT DISPLAYABLE Conditions (9) and (10) imply proposition 3. *E.J.L. E. 87 Proof of proposition 4 From the proposition 3 we know that the socially optimal prevention level can be achieved if Fe(##/e*)/F(##/e*) ? ce(e*)/u. Moreover, we can demonstrate that the function Fe(##/e*)/F(##/e*) is not increasing in ##.13 Consequently, if Fe(##/e*)/F(##/e*) ? ce(e*)/u, there is a level of damages ## ## such that Fe(##/e*)/F(##/e*) = ce(e*)/u. References Balkenborg, D. (2001). How liable should a lender beThe case of judgment-proof firms and environmental risk: Comment. American Economic Review, 91, 731-738. Beard, R. (1990). Bankruptcy and care choice. RAND Journal of Economics, 21, 626-634. Boyer, M., Laffont, J.-J. (1997). Environmental risks and bank liability. European Economic Review, 41, 1427-1459. Dari-Mattiacci, G., De Geest, G. (2005). Judgment Proofness under four different precaution technologies. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 161(1), 38-56. Dionne, G., Spaeter, S. (2003). Environmental risk and extended liability: The case of green technologies. Journal of Public Economics, 87(5-6), 1025-1060. Feess, E., Hege, U. (2000). Environmental harm and financial responsibility. Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance, Issues and Practice, 25(2), 220-234. Feess, E., Hege, U. (2003). Safety monitoring, capital structure and financial responsibility. International Review of Law and Economics, 23,323-339. Hutchison, E., Van’t Veld, K. (2005). Extended liability for environmental accidents: What you see is what you get. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 49, 157-173. Jost, P. (1996). Limited liability and the requirement to purchase insurance. International Review of Law and Economics, 16, 259-276. Lewis, T., Sappington, D. (1999). Using decoupling and deep pockets to mitigate judgment-proof problems. International Review of Law and Economics, 19, 275-293. Lewis, T., Sappington, D. (2001). How liable should a lender beThe case of judgment-proof firms and environmental risk: Comment.American Economic Review, 91, 724-730. Lipowsky-Posey, L. (1993). Limited liability and incentives when firms can inflict damages greater than worth. International Review of Law and Economics, 13, 325-330. Pitchford, R. (1995). How liable should a lender beThe case of judgment-proof firms and environmental risk. American Economic Review, 85,1171-1186. Polborn, M. (1998). Mandatory insurance and the judgment proof problem. International Review of Law and Economics, 18, 141-146. Ringleb, A. H., Wiggins, S. N. (1990). Liability and large-scale long-term hazards. Journal of Political Economy, 98, 574-595. Rogerson, W. (1985). The first-order approach to principal-agent problems. Econometrica, 53, 1357-1367. Shavell, S. (1986). The judgment proof problem. International Review of Law and Economics, 6, 45-58. Summers, J. S. (1983). The case of disappearing defendant: An economic analysis. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 132, 145-185. IRDES, 10 rue Vauvenargues, 75018 Paris, France e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] E.J.L. E. 2010, 30(2), 77-87 How to cite European journal of law economics, Essay examples

The Art Of Research Essay Example For Students

The Art Of Research Essay A kouros (plural kouroi) is a statue of a male youth, dating from the Archaic Period of Greek sculpture (about 650 BC to about 500 BC). The earliest kouroi were made of wood and have not survived, but by the seventh century the Greeks had learned from the Egyptians the art of carving stone with iron tools, and were making kouroi from stone, particularly marble from the islands of Paros and Samos. Modern art historians have used the word to refer to this specific type of male nude statue since the 1890s. Kouroi were also commonly known as Apollos, since it was believed that all kouroi depicted Apollo. The Ancient Greek word kouros meant a male youth, and is used by Homer to refer to young soldiers. From the fifth century the word connoted specifically an adolescent, beardless male, but not a child. Archaic kouroi were created at a time when Greece was under the cultural influence of Ancient Egypt, as can be seen by their characteristic frontal rigid pose, reminiscent of statues of Egyptian kings. Greeks would have seen such statues when visiting Egypt as merchants or mercenary soldiers hired by Egyptians. Kouroi nearly always stand with their arms hanging straight at their sides fingers curved, thumb foremost, although a few show one arm extended forward from the elbow, holding an offering. Like their kingly Egyptian prototypes, the kouros figures are often in the act of striding forward, head erect, eyes front, a faint smile (the archaic smile) on their lips.

Social Class in Madame Bovary free essay sample

Social Class in Madame Bovary During the 19th century, France was experiencing and suffering from a huge social disturbance. As a result, new social group was rising which was the bourgeoisie (middle class). These people got their chance thought commercials and events instead of inheritance. They were described by the word materialism. Gustave Flauberts book, Madame Bovary, he wrote about how good, simple, innocent and naive these people are. He also used the book to grab the peoples attention to the poorness of this class. It also shows the effect of social classes on a person. A good example of that will be Emma Bovary. The poor life of the middle caused her fall. This was because she always wanted a higher status, wealth, love and happiness. She saw everything in a different view. This things lead to her affairs and beings in debt and finally killing herself. Additionally, Emma is one of the intelligent characters in the book. We will write a custom essay sample on Social Class in Madame Bovary or any similar topic specifically for you Do Not WasteYour Time HIRE WRITER Only 13.90 / page Her capacity of imagination is great. She is very attentive to the outside details. She is attracted to how people are dressed and how they look but she doesnt Judge people depending on their characters or their inside. As a result of this, she is totally convinced by the people who act to be something more than what they really are. On the other hand, she hates the people who dont lie to her this is mostly because they are in her same social class. In addition, Emma is a very simple girl but she was always obsessed and dreamed of different types of imaginative love and being rich. One of the good examples that support that was when Charles took her to the ball. She considered it a chance to show everyone how sophisticated she is. The food served there was extremely expensive but wasnt expensive for the people who were there because they were from the top class. While eating, Emma noticed that several of the ladies had not put their gloves inside their glasses (45). It was habitual for middle class women to put their gloves in their wine glass to point out they wont drink. She was amazingly surprised by the women who were affording to drink wine and especially by the sophisticated ones who drank while eating. Also, she was convinced that the people there liked her very much and that they invited her to attend the following year but actually they invited them to the ball as a favor which will be once in there life. Actually during the ball Emma did loads of embarrassing things especially to the people in the upper class. she waltzes badly with the purpose f twisting her dress up with her partner and she uses the mistake as a reason to put her head on his chest. She was one of few people who left when the hosts where going to bed. All of these things showed how she was influenced by her social class. Additionally, after this ball she totally believes that she was born in the wrong social class and that everything would have been great if she was rich. She also believes she suffer as a result of having a noble soul. She considers herself as a tragic heroine. Another thing was that she was surprised when she knew that aristocrats dont have fancy food and drink on breakfast everyday. Moreover, she failed to realize that Rodolphes wasnt satisfied throughout his life despite his wealth. Moreover, Emma tries her best to have a friendship with a lot of people. She wants to be an aristocrat especially after the dAndervilliers ball. Even though she has a good appearance but sne lacks manners. This is proven in the book when sne tries to communicate or have a conversation with anyone from any social group and she fails. Also, people didnt really like her because of her reputation especially after having affairs. During Emmas life, she always chose to be the center of attention. She also convinced herself that best or ideal is the standard. When she was at the convent she followed the romantic novels she read. After going to the ball with Charles, she tried to copy or follow nobility and being rich and she found a new romantic man whom she consider as her ideal. Finally, Emma is simply a middle-class girl obsessed with a richer life. She believed that she was an aristocrat born by a mistake in a bourgeois prison but this is wrong. This is proven because all of her actions through out the book are influenced by the bourgeoisie class. Also, she commits suicide at the end as a result of her imagination and dreams.